

Varieties of Field Theory (Lewinian Social Psychology)

312

CONTEMPORARY THEORIES

restrictions on causal relationships. They accept the so-called contemporaneity principle, which states that only events coexisting at the same time can be causally related.

Apart from these metatheoretical considerations, there has been a high degree of commonality of theoretical content among field theories. Most important here are the widely shared interest in problems of perception and cognition and the correlated tendency to utilize perceptual and cognitive processes as explanatory factors. This is hardly surprising in view of the close relationship between modern field theories and classical Gestalt psychology, which was concerned primarily with similar emphases.

Principally, but by no means exclusively, field theory as used in psychology has come to refer to the metatheory of Kurt Lewin; his system is therefore the first described in the present chapter. The unique combination of behaviorism and Gestalt psychology achieved in the purposivism of E. C. Tolman is included as the second important specimen of field theory. The increasingly influential thinking of Egon Brunswik is next described. Then we turn to an examination of the contributions of Roger Barker, who combines ideas of Lewin with those of Brunswik in some unique investigations. Finally, other systematists (K. S. Lashley and J. R. Kantor) whose work may be classified as falling within some kind of field-theoretical classification are more briefly described.

LEWIN'S VECTOR FIELD THEORY

The contributions to psychological theory made by Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) have been among the most significant of recent decades. On the one hand, Lewin was a brilliant researcher. Even his severest critics recognize him as a most ingenious experimenter; the series of experimental studies which he directed while at the University of Berlin in the 1920s is a model of theoretical creativity and imagination combined with appropriate methodology. Throughout his career he remained a strong advocate of the primacy of directive theory in research, and he is best known for his development of the motivational, or vector, system of psychology, most commonly referred to as *field theory*.

Although Lewin was associated with an active center of Gestalt psychology at Berlin, he retained little formal identification with the orthodox group, and his systematizing went well beyond the usual confines of the school. As a matter of fact, there was no formal relationship between his theories and those of the Gestaltists. In a letter to Köhler that constitutes the preface to his book *The principles of topological psychology*, Lewin probably expresses his relationship to Gestalt psychology most succinctly: "I have tried my best to destroy the myth that Gestaltists do not attack each other" (1936, p. viii). Thus Lewin was a sort of half-Gestaltist, and perhaps felt most a member of the group when he was criticizing it! Lewin's early efforts were concerned largely with motivational problems of the individual subject, which led to an interest in problems of personality organization; his later efforts were concerned mainly with a wide variety of problems in social psychology, including his initiation of the group-dynamics move-

Max H. & Hilix, W. (1979)
Systems and Theories in Psychology
Third Edition, New York, Mcraw Hill

ment and his assistance in the development of *action research* (i.e., research directed at producing social changes). In between, he was peripherally concerned with problems such as the nature of learning, cultural factors in personality structure, and child development. But in all these diverse areas Lewin brought to bear on critical issues the same fundamental approach: an emphasis always upon the psychological, rather than the simple environmental, factors in the situation (or field). This emphasis is related to the earlier Gestalt distinction, most explicitly made by Koffka, between the "behavioral" and the "geographical" environments. The crux of the distinction is that the effective meaning of the environmental conditions depends upon more than merely physical attributes; that is, a description in terms of such factors alone is inadequate. An individual's *perception* of the physical attributes determines how that individual will react.

Lewin's Career

Kurt Lewin was born in Prussia and received his higher education at the Universities of Freiburg, Munich, and Berlin (Ph.D., 1914). He was thus present during the formative years of the Gestalt movement. After a 5-year interlude of military service, he returned to Berlin and remained in various academic capacities until 1932, when he came to the United States. He spent that year as visiting professor at Stanford and the following 2 years at Cornell. The decision to establish permanent residence in this country was made as a consequence of the rise of Nazi power in Germany, where his Jewish ancestry became a handicap. Lewin went to the Child Welfare Station of the State University of Iowa as professor of child psychology in 1935 and finally to Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1944. In this last appointment he was director of the Research Center for Group Dynamics, a movement which he had only fairly well started at the time of his death in 1947.

Marrow, in his biography *The practical theorist* (1969), describes Lewin as an enthusiastic, charming, and intellectually scintillating man. He was as far from the popular image of the German professor as Wundt and Titchener were close to it. Marrow describes him as being so democratic that he was a sort of natural American. He was very close to his students, and prone to make unannounced visits to their homes. Through them, as well as through his own research and conceptualization, he has left an indelible mark on American social psychology.

Roger Barker reported to Marrow that Lewin never had any conception of when to stop once he had begun a stimulating discussion. Only the excuse that he had to get home to his wife saved Barker from complete exhaustion on many occasions. Perhaps that level of intensity accounts in part for Lewin's tragically early death of a heart attack when he was only 56.

Lewin's major publications were in the form of journal reports and contributions to various collections of papers. His own papers have been collected in four small volumes. The first two of these, *A dynamic theory of personality* (1935) and *Principles of topological psychology* (1936), represent the earlier European phase of his career; the last two collections, *Resolving social conflicts* (1948) and *Field theory in social science* (1951), relate to the later American phase.

Topology and Hodological Space

Lewin selected topology, a relatively new geometry, as providing a mathematical model upon which he could base his conceptual representation of psychological processes. In brief, topology is a geometry in which spatial relationships are represented in a strictly nonmetrical manner. Positional relationships between areas or regions are maintained in spite of various kinds of changes in size and shape. The primary concern is with the connections between bounded regions and with their spatial relationships; for example, one area will remain inside another throughout a wide variety of stretchings and distortions. (See Brown, 1936, for a relatively simplified introduction to Lewin's use of the topological geometry.) Lewin felt that such positional relationships were the best way to conceptualize the structure of psychological relationships. There was, however, one serious limitation to topology: its lack of directional concepts. To represent the psychological concept of direction, Lewin then invented a new qualitative geometry (1938), which he named *hodological space* (from the Greek *hodos*, translated as "path"). He developed the characteristics of such a space that he felt were necessary for an adequate representation of the dynamic factors, usually called *vectors*, in psychological relationships.

Cartwright (1959, pp. 61-65) reports that recent researchers have substituted a new mathematical tool, the linear graph, for Lewin's topology plus hodology. On the planar maps which Lewin usually used to represent his life spaces, no more than four regions can have mutual boundaries. This limits the complexity of structure which can be represented on a two-dimensional, planar map. On a linear graph, an indefinite number of points (which replace regions in the life space) can be mutually interconnected. The linear graph also allows for the representation of asymmetrical relationships, as when movement can occur from region A to region B, but not back. There is no natural way to represent these asymmetries on the map.

Life Space

Lewin's objective in adapting and even inventing such geometries was to clarify his conceptualization of the psychological field, or *life space*. The life space is most simply defined as the totality of effective *psychological* factors for a given person at some particular time. It consists of a number of differentiated *regions*, which represent significant conditions in the person's life. Although the totality of factors is emphasized in definitions such as the above, in actual practice only the most relevant ones are ordinarily included in diagrammatic presentations of the life-space concept.

Let us illustrate Lewin's distinction between physical and psychological representations by a relatively simple example from his writing. Figure 11-1a shows the physical situation, and Figure 11-1b shows the psychological representation, where a goal object (toy) is placed out of reach within a circular area. Direct physical approach to the goal via path w_1 is not possible, but psychological locomotion, via path w_2 is effective if mother can be persuaded to obtain the toy. Although the example pictured involves a physical barrier, the same psychologi-




Figure 11-1 Situation in which a young child wishes to reach a toy that lies inside a circular barrier: (a) physical situation; (b) psychological situation. C, child; T, toy; I, barrier; M, mother; G, goal; w_1 , w_2 , paths. (Source: Lewin, 1936, p. 147.)

cal situation might obtain with a barrier produced by verbal restriction involving the toy, especially for an older child. Or, in somewhat similar situations, the barrier might consist of more strictly personal or intraorganismic factors such as politeness in a child trained not to take things without asking or timidity or even fear in some other child. In these cases the physical picture would show no barrier, but the psychological representation, for this slice of the life space, might look very much like that shown in the figure.

A somewhat more comprehensive example of a typical life space is shown in Figure 11-2. Here Lewin depicted a series of locomotions involving a particular occupational choice for a young man. Lewin (1936) pointed out that the passing of the college entrance examinations, while not a physical locomotion, represents a "real change of position in the quasi-social . . . life space. . . . Many things are now within his reach which were not before" (p.48). It is this kind of crossing from one region to another that is emphasized in the life-space schema.

Important dimensions of the life space, as Lewin conceptualized it, are its temporal and reality characteristics. As children grow older, not only does their life space become increasingly differentiated into regions as a function of maturity and expanding personal problems, but it also develops temporal and reality-irreality dimensions. For example, children begin to plan for the future as well as to respond more effectively in longer time units. Further, they begin to use imagery and fantasy and thus to live, in some degree, on an irreality level; there they are less restricted in behavior by the usual barriers of the real world.




Figure 11-2 Situation of a boy who wants to become a physician. P, person; G, goal; ce, college entrance examinations; c, college; m, medical school; i, internship; pr, establishing a practice. (Source: Lewin, 1936, p. 48)

The reality dimension is illustrated in Figure 11-3, in which Lewin showed three levels of this variable in the life space.

Lewin considered this dimension highly significant in a psychological analysis, and so it was given considerable attention in his work. Lewin did not believe that an absolute reality or irreality dimension was tenable because of the continually changing field of experiences; that is, what at one instant may be considered absolute reality may be altered by new events and experiences. Furthermore, as the individual matures, the reality-irreality dimension broadens and becomes more differentiated (1936, p. 204).

Perhaps the most widely known Lewinian contribution within the life-space framework is his conceptualization of conflict. He stated that there are three basic types of conflicts producing frustration: approach-approach, approach-avoidance, and avoidance-avoidance. Approach-approach conflict occurs when an individual desires to achieve two goals, only one of which is obtainable (e.g., one has two invitations for the same evening). Approach-avoidance conflict is characterized by a goal which is both desired and undesired (e.g., one desires the money but not the effort entailed in a proffered job). An avoidance-avoidance conflict is present when anticipated consequences are both undesirable (e.g., one must accept an unwanted invitation or offend an esteemed friend). This type of conflict is characterized by a vacillation between the alternatives or by an attempt to escape the situation ("leave the field").

One misinterpretation of Lewin's life space occurs often enough to demand discussion. This is that the life space is the same as the phenomenal world of the person who occupies the life space. That is not true. Lewin intended the life space as a representation of the factors which influenced the behavior and perception of the individual. Some of these factors might be quite unconscious. Thus the life space is a conceptual device in the service of the scientist. The phenomenology of




Figure 11-3 Representation of different degrees of reality by an additional dimension of the life space. *R*, more real level; *I*, more irreal level; *P*, person. In a level of greater reality the barriers are stronger, and the person *P* is more clearly separated from the environment. (Source: Lewin, 1936, p. 200.)

the individual may be either close to or rather distant from the life space as conceptualized by the psychologist. Although the life space is intended to represent the *concrete* reality in which the individual is immersed, it also shares an *abstract* quality with theories like Hull's.

Lewin's System

It is impossible to describe any single integrated system constructed by Lewin (such as that described for Hull in Chapter 10). This is mainly because Lewin never attempted to produce such an integrated system; when not concerned with methodological problems in field theory, he worked on a variety of different problems. All of them involved somewhat the same general type of working assumptions and procedures and to a great extent the same constructs. However, no serious attempt was made by Lewin to coordinate these concepts into one systematic framework (cf. Cartwright, 1959).

The series of researches involving Lewin's assumption of the *tension system* has been selected as the best example of his work; in some respects it comes close to being an integrated system. A continuing series of experimental studies, some of them described below, was based upon implications of this central concept. Lewin himself has provided a theoretical account of these researches, emphasizing the formal assumptions and derivations (Lewin, 1940, pp. 13-28; 1944, pp. 4-20). Our treatment follows this account as well as the more informal description given by Deutsch (1954, pp. 199ff.).

The background for Lewin's development of the construct of the tension system goes back to his first psychological research (1917). He was interested in refining some of Ach's (1910) earlier research on the strength of the will. The general procedure here was to establish associations of nonsense syllables through repeated pairings and then to evaluate the strength of the voluntary factor, manipulated by instructions, by opposing it to the habitual tendency. (See Hilgard, 1956, pp. 258ff., for a description of this research and the theoretical rationales.) Lewin finally rejected Ach's attempt to supplement the association factor with such new constructs as set and determining tendency, in the tradition of the Würzburg school, to which Ach belonged (see Chapter 4). He felt that Ach had not gone far enough in his interpretation. Rather than accept *both* association and voluntary factors, Lewin simply assumed two voluntary factors. He pointed out that association per se provided no motive power. That power had to be accounted for in some other way; as he later put it:

Dynamically, an "association" is something like a link in a chain, i.e., a pattern of restraining forces without intrinsic tendency to create a change. This property of a need or quasi-need can be represented by coordinating it to a "system in tension." By taking this construct seriously and using certain operational definitions, particularly by correlating the "release of tension" to a "satisfaction of the need" (or "reaching of the goal") and the "setting up of tension" to an "intention" or to a "need in a state of hunger," a great many testable conclusions were made possible. (1940, p. 14)

The first formal effort to test the tension-system proposition thus developed by Lewin was the doctoral-dissertation research done by Zeigarnik (1927) under

his supervision. Her experiments were based on the assumptions that (1) tension systems would be established in a subject when given simple tasks to perform and (2) if such tension systems were not dissipated, as would normally occur with the completion of the tasks, their persistence would result in a greater likelihood of subsequent recall by the subject of the names of the tasks. Her results in a variety of experiments substantially confirmed this prediction, since interrupted tasks were generally better recalled by subjects than completed tasks. There has been an extensive experimental literature (cf. Alper, 1948; Deutsch, 1954) concerning this interesting phenomenon, the so-called Zeigarnik effect.

The next experimental test of the tension-system construct was performed by Ovsiankina (1928). She showed that subjects would voluntarily resume interrupted activities more often than they would return to activities that had been completed.

Following the confirmatory results of these first two studies, further experimental tests were performed. Among the better known of these are the studies of Lissner (1933) and Mahler (1933) on the role of substitute activities as effective dischargers of tension; of Hoppe (1930) and J. D. Frank (1935) on success and failure, especially as these are related to the "level of aspiration" expressed by the subject; and of Karsten (1928) on "psychical satiation," which concerns the problem of the reduction in performance of an activity as a function of the continued repetition of the activity. A summary of these and other related studies is provided by Lewin (1935, pp. 239ff.). Although we do not have space here to present a further development of Lewin's contributions to research and theory via the tension-system construct, its fruitfulness is well attested by the manner in which these concepts and problems have been used in personality theory (cf. Deutsch, 1954).

Lewin's later concern with systematic problems of social psychology may be illustrated by his interesting, and somewhat unusual, wartime research on food habits of people (Lewin, 1943b; see also Lewin, 1951, chap. 8). Here Lewin raised first the question of why people eat what they do. Interaction of psychological factors (e.g., cultural tradition, individual preference) and nonpsychological factors (e.g., food availability, cost) was investigated in the framework of a so-called channel theory. According to this viewpoint, most of the food that appears on the table is eventually eaten by someone or other in the family group, so that the primary question reduces to the particular channels by which food is obtained for family use. The two major sources of food in this country during World War II were store purchases and gardening (minor channels were country buying, home baking and canning, and the like). Lewin emphasized the role of the "gatekeeper"—ordinarily the housewife—as the individual who determines for each channel how much of each foodstuff shall be procured and taken through the various stages of preparation for consumption (in the case of home gardening, of course, more steps are necessary before the final usable products are available for the table).

The psychology of the gatekeeper, as Lewin phrased it, thus became a focal point of this research. Although several interesting questions were asked in the

pursuit of the problem, we shall outline only one that received considerable empirical attention. That is the question of the most effective procedure for changing opinions. Here attention centered on individual versus group procedures. Lewin pointed out (1951, chap. 10) that an a priori expectation might well be that single individuals, being "more pliable" than groups of like-minded persons, should be easier to convince. An opposite conclusion, however, is supported by the preponderance of much research (on a variety of social problems, such as alcoholism and prejudices, as well as food habits). Once the group standards themselves are changed, as by group rather than individual discussions, individual opinions are much more readily altered.

One illustrative study concerned increased consumption of fresh milk. No pressure was used in the individual or group discussions, and equal time was spent in each case. The results showed clearly that compliance by housewives with the requested change was greater following the group procedure. Similar results were found for other types of foodstuffs (such as evaporated milk and orange juice) and for quite different social problems (such as increased productivity among factory workers). A public commitment to a new course of action seems generally to produce more permanence of changed attitudes or behaviors. In some cases, the degree of change may even increase over a period of time following the experimental manipulations; when this happens there is said to be a "sleeper effect."

This research is a good example of the way in which Lewin's work combined theoretically important questions with practically significant problems and procedures. Food acceptability was of practical importance when Lewin started this research during wartime, and as the world's population increases, the problem promises to become of permanent practical significance. More generally, group processes are important to man's sense of well-being, and to his very survival. The contemporary upsurge in interest in such activities as T groups can be traced, to a very great extent, directly to the work of Lewin (see, for example, Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964).

Criticisms of Lewin

Most of the criticism of Lewin has been related to his field-theoretical approach. London (1944) has charged that Lewin misappropriated and misused topological concepts. London claimed that in his purported use of topology Lewin had merely borrowed the terminology and certain of the gross conceptualizations from this geometry and failed to use anything like the full set of fundamental topological relationships. In answer to this objection, Lewin argued that all that can legitimately be required of psychologists who attempt to apply a mathematical model is that they coordinate some of

(1951):

not, London's criticism is well taken, and there really are no predictions based on the coordination of topology and psychology. The totality of the evidence seems to indicate that Lewin's predictions were based on informal arguments and prior observations, rather than on deductions within topology. Even if this judgment is correct, however, the topological analogy may have had a good deal of motivational and heuristic value for Lewin and his students. Marrow (1969) says that they often carried on animated discussions in Lewin's home with the aid of a litter of paper and colored pencils, used to make topological diagrams! Such procedure is obviously valuable, even if it lacks formal rigor.

Another criticism, voiced even by some who are strongly sympathetic to Lewin (Deutsch, 1954), as well as by less friendly critics, has been that he has failed to specify which of several possible interpretations he intended for key terms, such as *person*, of key relationships, such as *person to life space*. A related but much more fundamental criticism (Estes, 1954) has been that Lewin has generally failed to indicate the empirical basis of his psychological concepts, such as life space, in spite of his admirable emphasis upon the necessity for strict operational coordinating definitions of concepts.

A corollary to the above stricture is the objection that Lewin in his emphasis upon the central cognitive aspects of behavior has tended to ignore the motor aspects. Field theorists generally, with their perceptual or cognitive orientation, have tended to undervalue the response side of the S-O-R formulation.

In a much-cited criticism, Brunswik has gone even further, holding that Lewin's "encapsulation into the central layer" means that his life space "is post-perceptual and pre-behavioral" (1943). Lewin's reply to this particular comment has been that he did not think that psychology needs to study the objective physical and sociological factors which do not have implications for behavior. However, he was willing to include the study of those objective factors which are potential determiners of the life space; this kind of study he called *psychological ecology* (Lewin, 1943a). Cartwright's paper contains a carefully detailed formulation of this problem of the "boundary zone" of the life space (1959, pp. 69ff.).

Critical evaluations of the more technical aspects of Lewinian field theory may be found in Leeper (1943) and Cartwright (1959). Comprehensive reviews by Deutsch (1954) and Escalona (1954) cover the contributions of his work to social psychology and child psychology, respectively.

Finally, a serious objection to Lewin has been that he failed to make his general conceptual system sufficiently precise and specific so that it can be disconfirmed by experimental test. To quote Estes:

This informal development of coordinating definitions in use enables the theorist to give plausible accounts of concrete situations, but with no possibility of having the theory refuted by the outcome of the behavioral situation, since the correspondence between theoretical and empirical terms is adjusted in accordance with the empirical findings and is never formally incorporated into the system. Flexibility is obtained at the cost of testability. (1954, p. 332)

It is necessary to recognize the important distinction between Lewin's effective experimental-theoretical research on specific problems, emphasized in the

following section, and his theoretical efforts, criticized in the preceding paragraph for their lack of adequate empirical specification. In particular, the life-space schemata seem to be of limited value in setting up experiments. They serve as pedagogic devices and provide a general stimulating effect for the experimenter. Although it is impossible to identify the sources of a thinker's influence with certainty, it seems likely that Lewin's tremendous contemporary influence stems less from his formal theorizing than from his informal theorizing and the associated empirical work.

Lewin's Contributions

Lewin has few peers as a creative conceptualizer and an ingenious experimenter. It was largely this ability to implement his theoretical insights with concrete empirical situations that accounts for his preeminence. This ability was apparently based, at least in part, upon insightful observations of the everyday-life scene. For example, his conceptualization of the tension system in relation to memory (cf. the Zeigarnik effect, described above) is said to have been suggested by his observation that waiters in Berlin restaurants had a remarkably accurate memory for the detailed amount of each bill—but only until it was paid (G. W. Hartmann, 1935, p. 221).

Lewin's specific contributions to psychological theory were of great scope and depth. He developed concepts and experimental techniques, such as level of aspiration, that have enjoyed widespread acceptance in the fields of personality and motivation. These contributions to personality theory have had a strong, continuing influence.

Finally, Lewin's pioneering efforts in the field of social psychology would be sufficient to guarantee him a lasting and prominent place in the history of psychology. His early research in social psychology in this country is exemplified by the pioneer studies (Lewin, 1939; Lippitt, 1940; Lippitt & White, 1943) on behavior in social climates that were experimentally manipulated. For example, leadership techniques were experimentally varied in boys' clubs (laissez-faire, democratic, autocratic), and various behaviors, such as aggression, were correlated with different social climates that resulted (Lippitt & White, 1943). These studies not only opened up an important new area of social research but also had some influence upon educational and social practices (Cartwright, 1959).

The final phase of Lewin's research, concerned mainly with group dynamics, found him taking more of an administrative and supervisory role and leaving to others the detailed working out of hypotheses and collection of data. In *Resolving social conflicts* (1948), Lewin reported on various experimental efforts to change social behavior in real, everyday-life situations (such as interracial factory workshops). It is unfortunate that his relatively early death prevented further contributions to this kind of research program.

The lines of work started by Lewin certainly did not stop with his death. He was one of those rare individuals who are in tune with the times 25 to 50 years after they are no longer alive. The problems connected with social influence and leadership are still under active study. Field observations, which so often gave Lewin his inspiration, are fast gaining respectability as a source of psychological

information (Willems & Raush, 1969). His concern, late in life, with psychological ecology must have provided part of the impetus for Barker's work resulting in a book on precisely that topic (1968). Even his attempt to find parallels between different fields, best seen in his general attitude toward field theory and his attempt to use mathematical formalism, may have, at the least, provided part of the general background for the development of general systems theory (see Buckley, 1968, for papers in this area). To say that Kurt Lewin was one of the germinal figures for modern psychology is praise too faint.

Few psychologists have been as eager as Lewin to contribute to the solutions of social problems. Part of his practical interest is traceable to his own personal experiences. He had been in the German army in World War I and had experienced the disaster that was postwar Germany. His own mother died as a victim of the Nazis during World War II, and he felt the long arm of anti-Semitism even in the United States. It was a Jewish religious group concerned with the elimination of prejudice that funded the Research Center for Group Dynamics which Lewin founded at MIT. Circumstance and temperament seemed to combine in him to form a unique combination of theoretician and man of action. No wonder, then, that his interests encompassed leadership and prejudice, and that he devoted so much attention and ingenuity to methods of changing behavior.

So great was the effect of Lewin as a human being and as an investigator that it is hardly hyperbole to describe American social psychology as a Lewinian development. However, Lewin's theory and the earlier Berlin developments were almost completely abandoned. He had changed his own interests in his later years, and the early work was not easily accessible, not to mention not easily understood, in the United States. A book by de Rivera (1976) may change this situation. He has collected the early Berlin dissertations, related them to the theoretical background, and added theoretical suggestions of his own. If empirical work by de Rivera or by others is stimulated anew, even the previously neglected interests of Lewin may enjoy a renaissance.

COGNITIVE FIELD THEORY: TOLMAN'S PURPOSIVE BEHAVIORISM

The important contribution of Edward C. Tolman (1886-1959) to the development of behaviorism has already been noted (Chapter 6). The emphasis which he early placed on a *molar* interpretation of behavior as *purposive* (1932) persisted throughout his long and illustrious career. Although Tolman cannot be said to have developed a definitive theory, his system of psychology, with its primarily cognitive, or S-S, position on learning, has been extremely influential. He has been the most acceptable of the major avowed behaviorists to nonbehavioristically oriented psychologists. His system represents the seemingly paradoxical combination of important elements of behaviorism and Gestalt psychology. His primary orientation has been stimulus-centered, or cognitive, rather than S-R; in his later papers especially (e.g., 1949a) he has not only professed a deep-seated admiration for the field-theoretical views of Kurt Lewin but also adopted a Lewinian