

# MEIHODS OF RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

SECOND EDITION

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# FOREWORD

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New scientific fields are often the breeding grounds for controversy and crisis. Debates regarding basic methods and ultimate goals—as well as general theories and specific findings—are common as new disciplines seek to establish their identities. In this formative period, schools of thought emerge; central questions for study are identified, and tools and methods for addressing these issues are devised. Frequently, these early schools of thought can be seen as deriving from the seminal work of individual pioneers and their followers in the field. As a result, “insiders’” histories of the early days of such fields typically read much like intellectual genealogies.

Certainly this has been true of social psychology in its first half-century as an experimental enterprise. In the beginning, as it were, there was Kurt Lewin—in many respects, the “father” of modern social psychology. Out of Lewin’s laboratory, after his move to this country, emerged Leon Festinger, the preeminent theorist in social psychology for the two decades following Lewin’s death, and the man to whose memory this volume is appropriately dedicated. Elliot Aronson, in turn, began his career as a graduate student in Festinger’s lab at Stanford, as did Merrill Carlsmith as an undergraduate. After their move to Harvard, Aronson continued as Carlsmith’s mentor. Together they produced a series of elegant and influential experimental studies of cognitive dissonance and attitude change processes that remain classics to this day.

From their productive collaboration, as well, came the famous *Handbook of Social Psychology* chapter from which the first edition of this book derived. In that chapter, Aronson and Carlsmith tried—for the first time in the history of the field—to illuminate the pragmatic issues that arise in the actual “doing” of experimental social psychology. Many previous sources, to be sure, were available for students who wanted to learn about the formal properties of various research designs or the statistical analysis of experimental data. Aronson

and Carlsmith's was the first attempt, however, to articulate the immense store of "tacit knowledge" that is required for the effective implementation of general design principles, and for the realization of abstract theories in successful experimental research in social psychology—to codify the "oral traditions" that had been passed informally from one generation to the next.

Perhaps even more significantly, Aronson and Carlsmith set for themselves a higher standard. Where other books on research methods had sought to inform students about how to avoid sources of bias and invalidity, the *Handbook* chapter aspired to teach something about the process of designing and implementing experiments that were not only technically correct but also elegant, interesting, and important. Their goal, in short, was to inspire others in the design of future classics—experiments with a significant "tale to tell" of the sort for which they, themselves, were so well known.

In elaborating this brief primer on experimental methods into the first edition of this book, Aronson and Carlsmith were joined by Phoebe Ellsworth. Continuing the chain, Ellsworth had collaborated with her mentor, Carlsmith, on studies of nonverbal behavior at Stanford, and had then gone on to make important contributions of her own in the areas of emotion and psychology-and-law. Together, the three offered students a guide to both the art and the science of social psychological experimentation. Their efforts provided not only an effective theoretical rationale for experimentation, but also a detailed look at its practice in social psychology—from the initial elicitation of informed consent to the administration of the postexperimental interview.

Although it is a pleasure to welcome this second edition of *Methods of Research in Social Psychology*, it is hard to do so without some sadness. Merrill Carlsmith died in 1984, at the age of 48. His untimely death was a personal tragedy to his friends and colleagues, and a significant loss to the field. More recently, as this Foreword was being prepared, Leon Festinger also passed away. His demise in some ways marks the end of an era in social psychology.

It would be equally difficult, however, not to greet this revision with joy, as well. In the authorship of the book, we see again the proverbial passing of the mantle as Aronson and Ellsworth are joined by Marti Hope Gonzales, a recent student of Aronson's, who has just embarked on her own career in social psychology. In the substance of this volume, we find the continuing intellectual legacy of Carlsmith, Festinger, and Lewin—ready to inform and to inspire yet future generations of researchers.

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## PREFACE

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In the early 1970s when we (Carlsmith, Ellsworth, and Aronson) first decided to expand the Aronson-Carlsmith chapter on experimental methodology in the *Handbook of Social Psychology* (1969) into a book, social psychology was in the midst of a crisis. At the heart of the crisis was a persistent questioning of the viability of the experimental method as used by social psychologists. In the preface to the first edition of this book, we wrote:

During the past few years, the experimental method seems to have lost favor in the hearts of many social psychologists. Many of us have grown weary of reading about brief and lifeless encounters between strangers who cross each other's paths once—or not at all—in an antiseptic laboratory and then are rushed into isolation in order that they may fill out seven-point scales which confirm the small hypotheses of a limited mind. Like a faltering dictator who has extended himself beyond the range of his competence, the experimental method is increasingly subject to vituperative attacks by some who were once staunch supporters, but who now speak with the revolutionary rhetoric of a new convert. We welcome the questioning inherent in this development; we don't like dictatorships, and we feel that the field sorely needs a more representative methodology.

We wrote the first edition, in part, to reaffirm our belief in the importance and viability of the experimental method, to help our colleagues expand their options into new and different experimental procedures, and to demystify the experimental method in the minds of graduate students so that they might learn the skills that would help them take their places as creative and knowledgeable practitioners of what we regard as an important and noble art. In discussing the criticisms, we wrote:

Many of the criticisms are well taken, and we have attempted to incorporate them in our remarks (e.g., the repeated emphasis on the importance of multiple methods). Yet we feel that much of the criticism of experimentation has been directed at non-

essential attributes: the college sophomore, the laboratory, the trivial tasks, the seven-point scales, and so on. An experiment is simply a form. Its single essential attribute is random assignment of subjects to conditions, and when this random assignment is possible and not ridiculous, it confers an important benefit—a certain minimum guaranteed level of confidence that the treatments caused the observed differences in behavior. Experiments are not unique in providing information about causal relationships, but they are wonderfully efficient compared to the alternatives currently available in social science. Many of the proposed “alternatives,” such as the movement to field settings, are not incompatible with the experimental method. Others, such as the development of quasi-experimental designs, rely on the experiment as a standard against which the value (and potential shortcomings) of the quasi-experimental approximations can be assessed. An understanding of the experimental method is in some sense fundamental to an intelligent understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives. The whole point of learning “methodology” is to be able to choose the most appropriate method for answering a particular question; our recent awakening to the recognition that the experiment may not always be the best method should not lead us to the absurd conclusion that it is never the best method.

More than a decade has passed since we put those thoughts on paper. The crisis appears to be over. But we have not changed our basic stance. As in the first edition, we will continue to make as strong a case as we can for the elegance of the experimental method, and for its improvement. As we stated in the first edition, within this basic form of the experiment, an infinite number of possibilities exist; it is our aim to help the reader explore some of those possibilities. Indeed, some of these possibilities have begun to merge with greater frequency during the past ten years.

For example, while the high-impact experimental procedure (in the tradition of Milgram, Asch, and Festinger & Carlsmith) remains the hallmark of experimental social psychology, contemporary research on *social cognition* has led to an increasingly popular methodological paradigm known as the “judgment experiment.” In the judgment experiment, subjects are asked to recognize, recall, classify, evaluate, or reason about stimulus materials presented by the experimenter. Such experiments typically emphasize control and systematic variations in the stimulus environment; in these procedures, impact on subjects is important only insofar as the stimuli capture and hold their attention and elicit meaningful responses. Of course, there is considerable variation in the extent to which subject involvement is engendered by the experimental task, but what judgment studies have in common is the emphasis placed on stimulus control when subjects are asked to serve as *observers*.

Another important change has taken place since the first edition of this book: There has been a sharp increase in the number of researchers in social psychology who have turned their primary attention from basic experiments to social issues and problems confronting people outside the laboratory. Such *applied* social psychological research brings investigators face to face with the complexities of “real-world” phenomena. Although the impact of these phenomena—school desegregation, the arms race, the AIDS epidemic, the energy

crisis—exceeds that of laboratory experiments, it is often difficult to assess their powerful effects experimentally. Much of what happens to people outside the laboratory is beyond the researcher’s control, and it is often difficult to assign people randomly to treatments or conditions. For these reasons, applied researchers often forgo pure experimentation in favor of such alternatives as quasi-experiments, surveys, interviews, and systematic observations.

Accordingly, we have expanded our treatment of experimental and non-experimental methods of research in this second edition. Of course, we hasten to add that some things *haven’t* changed. In our judgment, the controlled experiment *still* remains the single most powerful tool for enabling investigators to disentangle just what causes what, and is the standard against which other research methods continue to be measured. Therefore, it is the controlled experiment—in its myriad guises—that remains the focus of this edition.

A knowledge of experimental methodology is worthwhile, even for people who do not intend to conduct experiments. We are constantly bombarded with information from the print and electronic media, much of which contains explicit or implicit assertions about human social behavior. From Dear Abby to Phil Donahue, from Dr. Ruth to Ted Koppel, commentators are continually telling us about how we humans behave and why we behave as we do. It becomes the task of consumers of this information to separate the wheat from the chaff—to separate reasonable journalistic conclusions or interpretations from inferences that are biased or just plain wrong. Not all of our readers are going to do experiments; but the analytical skills involved in designing and conducting experiments are an important set of tools for examining assertions in this arena. Experiments are the product of a particular way of reasoning about the social world. It is our contention that knowing *how* to think is even more important than knowing *what* to think. There are no valid answers unless and until we find the correct way to formulate the question. It is that conviction that prompted us to write the first edition, and that fuels this effort.

As in the first edition, it is our goal to demystify the process of planning and conducting social psychological research by discussing in a sequential fashion the concerns, problems, pitfalls, and joys that researchers encounter from the time they first conceive of an idea or formulate a question to the time they close up shop, answer in hand.

In the first edition, we mentioned that we were indebted both to our students and to our professional colleagues whose ideas and suggestions contributed directly to our thinking. If anything, this debt has increased over the years, and we appreciate the many helpful comments and suggestions for the second edition provided by the following reviewers: Shelly Chaiken, New York University; Mykol Hamilton, University of California—Los Angeles; and Edward E. Jones, Princeton University. We are also grateful to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, where we sat on the terrace and planned both the first and second editions.

While handing out bouquets, we would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the great debt we owe to our teachers. In this regard, it is particularly meaningful that we dedicate this volume to Leon Festinger; in the history of social psychology, he was arguably the greatest teacher of how to do experiments. He blazed a magnificent trail for those of us who followed him, by finding ways to ask important questions in a scientifically precise manner. As far as we know, Festinger never taught a course on how to do experiments; yet, because of the ground he broke, just about everyone doing experiments in social psychology is indirectly in his debt. For the authors of this volume, the debt is a bit more direct: one of us (E.A.) worked closely with Festinger for three years as his graduate research assistant; one of us (J.M.C.) worked with him as an undergraduate (and with Aronson as a graduate student); the others (M.H.G. and P.C.E.) can trace their lineage to Festinger by way of Aronson and Carlsmith, respectively. Festinger never taught a course on social psychological experimentation; he taught by example, and by critically looking over the shoulders of students who feel his presence even some thirty years later! We believe that the kind of mentor-student relationship that Festinger practiced is the best way to learn the art of experimentation. We offer this volume as a supplement—and as homage—to the apprenticeship model.

We made the decision to dedicate this book to Leon some time ago—as a surprise “gift” to that great and good man. Recent events have rendered the dedication particularly poignant: As the book was about to go to press, we were deeply saddened to learn of Leon Festinger’s sudden death at the age of 69. Our sense of loss, both personal and professional, is immeasurable.

*Elliot Aronson*

*Phoebe C. Ellsworth*

*Marti Hope Gonzales*

# METHODS OF RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

# INTRODUCTION

A college student stands waiting outside the door of an empty classroom. It is the hour scheduled for a psychology experiment, and he is to be a subject. Standing with him are seven or eight other students, also waiting for the experimenter. One of them—the person who first called him up and told him about the experiment—is a friend. He doesn't know any of the others. Now that the moment has arrived, the student is a little nervous. He has never been in a psychology experiment before; he wonders whether the experimenter is going to ask him a lot of personal questions. What if the experimenter decides to probe his Freudian impulses in front of the other people? He looks around at the other subjects and comforts himself with the thought that he can't possibly be made *too* conspicuous. After all, they're all in the same boat.

The experimenter arrives, unlocks the classroom door, and asks the subjects to be seated in the front row. The student—seeing that his friend already has people sitting on both sides of him—takes one of the last remaining seats near the end of the row. The experimenter then addresses the group, explaining that the experiment involves a test of perceptual judgment and that their task will be to match lines of equal length. Propping up two large, white cards in the chalk tray of the blackboard, the experimenter turns to the subjects and gives them instructions:

This task involves the discrimination of lengths of lines. You see the pair of white cards in front. On the left is a single line; on the right, three lines of differing lengths are numbered 1, 2, and 3 in order. One of the three lines at the right is equal to the standard line at the left; you will decide in each case which is the equal line. You will state your judgment in terms of the corresponding number. There will be twelve such comparisons. As the number of lines is few and the group small, I shall call on



each of you in turn to announce your judgment, which I shall record here on the prepared form. Please be as accurate as possible. Let's start at the right and proceed to the left.

he student listens to these instructions and feels relieved, smiling to himself over his foolish speculations about Freudian questions. The experiment is simple and straightforward, and, at least on the first set of cards, the matching line is obvious. It is number 3. The student is even spared the embarrassment of having to speak first, since his seat is the next to the last in the row.

The first subject calls out his judgment: "It is line 3." Then the second, third, and fourth subjects respond—and so on—until it is the student's turn. He says "3," and the person in the last seat agrees. It is an easy task; the judgment is unanimous. The experimenter removes the cards and replaces them with a new pair, with new standard and comparison lines. The student glances up and sees that again the matching line is number 3. The first subject calls out, "line 3," and the others follow suit. The student calls out "3" in his turn and watches the experimenter remove the second pair of cards. It is an easy task, but tedious. Ten more trials to go, and already he feels bored. Some personal questions would at least have been more stimulating.

"This one is line 2," announces the first subject. The student stops daydreaming and returns his attention to the task. He glances up at the new set of cards. The matching line is obviously number 1. With a smirk, he turns to the person sitting next to him, but this person is staring calmly ahead at the cards and seems not to have noticed the first subject's careless mistake. The student checks the lines again; there is no doubt that number 1 is correct.

"Number 2," announces the second subject. Now the student is getting nervous again. He squints at the line, but line number 2 is plainly shorter than the standard line. The second subject must be a real conformist, just repeating the first subject's answer, even though it was wrong. The student looks up at the experimenter, who is proceeding just as though everything were normal, pointing at the third subject for a judgment. The student leans forward a little to hear what the subject will say.

"Line 2." Now the student is forced to think about what to do when his own turn comes. Suppose that the other three subjects also say it's line number 2. He will look like an idiot if he says it's number 1 after six people have already agreed that it was number 2. Maybe someone will save him. Maybe someone else will think it is number 1, so that he won't be the only deviant. But it is number 1. It's a simple question of fact—there is only one right answer, and it's obvious. So what could be the matter? He turns to the person next to him and whispers, "What were the instructions again?"

"You're supposed to pick the one that's the same length as the standard." "Oh yeah, that's right."

"Number 2," calls out the subject next to him. The experimenter is pointing at him now—it's his turn. He squints at the line one more time, but there's no doubt.

"Number 1," he murmurs.

"What's that?" asks the experimenter. "I couldn't hear you."

"Well, it looks like number 1 to me," says the student, shrugging his shoulders.

He looks down at his shoes, but he can hear the group fall silent. He knows that they are all staring at him—the experimenter too—wondering why his judgment was the only one that was different. Maybe he's got some weird visual defect. But maybe—it's just possible—they were *all* sheep, following the first guy's mistake. Maybe by now the first subject is laughing because he sees what's happened, and all the others are feeling embarrassed because they don't have the courage to call it as they saw it. Maybe now that he has spoken for what he believed, the last subject will have the courage to do it, too. He looks up a little. The experimenter is pointing at the last subject.

"Number 2," says the last subject.

A new pair of cards is placed at the rack, and the student studies them intently. It's line number 3—clearly. He moves his head from side to side in case it's some kind of optical illusion based on the angle of vision. Number 3 it is, and he would defend his judgment no matter what. He waits apprehensively for the first subject's judgment.

"Line 1."

The experiment continues for eight more trials. Sometimes—to the student's immense relief—there is no argument; everyone else agrees with him. But more often, the group is unanimously against him. Unanimously. He is tense and acutely self-conscious, his confidence in his judgment shaken. How can it be that he sees a simple thing like that *differently* from everybody else? Maybe something is wrong with him. Maybe it is a special test to pick out crazy people. He dreads his turn. Once or twice he has called out the same number as the others, even though it didn't look that way to him. Thinking of the silence and the stares, seeing himself as the center of the trouble, he has convinced himself that there was room for doubt about the lines. But it doesn't make him feel any better. He feels he has betrayed himself by abandoning his own personal viewpoint. Whether he yields to the group or remains independent, he feels like a freak.

At the end of the experiment, the experimenter asks him to stay for a few minutes and asks him about his reactions. The experimenter then tells him that all members of the group were cooperating with the experimenter by giving wrong answers on some of the trials, calling two obviously different lines equal. The experiment was a study in social psychology designed to learn about reactions to group pressure, to find out how people feel and what they do when the evidence of their senses is contradicted by the unanimous judgments of their peers.

The subjects in this experiment conducted by Solomon Asch (1951)

were deceived, and they were upset. They were led to believe that their own perceptions were seriously at variance with those of other people. In this experiment, the subjects are put into a state of conflict, and they must decide whether to go along with the judgment of the others or to stand alone. In either case, they experience misgivings, discomfort, and distress. If they resist, they may feel that they are cowards or conformists. This feeling may be intensified rather than relieved when, at the close of the session, the experimenter reveals that the entire situation was prearranged. Far from removing the discomfort, the experimenter may be adding insult to injury. The yielders may leave the experiment with reduced self-respect. They may believe—perhaps for the first time—that they lack the courage to stand up for their beliefs. Is it fair of the social psychologist to make people feel this way? The use of noxious or deceptive situations by an experimenter raises many ethical issues which cannot be taken lightly.

The problem of group pressure in society—pressure strong enough to move individuals to act against their beliefs and values—also raises many social issues which cannot be taken lightly. Asch was deeply concerned with the conditions that lead some people to yield or to resist when confronted with powerful group pressures. He believed that he could not answer questions about these conditions unless he placed people in a situation in which real group pressures were operating.

Why, though, did Asch decide to study group pressure by means of an experiment? Why did he bother to set up a special situation and train a large group of students to play the role of a unanimous majority and go to all the trouble involved in conducting a laboratory experiment, when there are hundreds of groups in the world outside of the laboratory whose members exert pressure for conformity? Why not simply observe one of these groups or ask people to think of situations in which they were under strong social pressure and to describe how they behaved? What are the characteristics of the experiment, as opposed to other forms of research? There are many ways of carrying out research in social psychology, and in Chapter 1 we discuss some of the advantages and disadvantages of experiments as research tools.

How could Asch be sure that what he was really studying was group pressure? How could he be sure that the experience was realistic to the subject? What does it mean to be "realistic" in an experiment? What would it mean if someone else did the experiment a little differently and got different results? How do we know whether the results that we get in an experiment have anything to do with the social situations outside the laboratory? There are some very serious problems with the use of the experimental method in an area as complex as social psychology; we examine some of these problems, as well as some partial solutions, in Chapter 2.

Why did the Asch experiment involve so much deception? Why did he tell the subjects a false story about perceptual judgment, train a large group of people to give incorrect responses, and pretend that the whole experiment was

something different from what it was? What are the consequences of deceiving subjects? Are there ways of studying social processes without using deception? The use of deception in social psychological research raises serious and controversial issues—among them ethical issues about deception's potentially undesirable effects. In Chapter 3 we address some ethical quandaries faced by experimenters who use deception, and we evaluate some of the alternatives suggested by social psychologists. There are additional ethical issues, as well, for example, when participants in social psychological research are made to experience physical or psychological pain or are induced to confront unpleasant aspects of themselves. There are no fixed and ready solutions to these kinds of dilemmas faced by researchers, but we shall discuss some factors to consider in making the most humane and methodologically sound decisions.

In order to qualify as an experiment, a piece of research must have at least two different treatments. In the Asch experiment, some subjects made their judgments in the presence of a unanimous majority (treatment 1), and others made their judgments alone (treatment 2). Asch knew that the unanimous majority had a powerful effect on subjects' responses, because the subjects who had to make their judgments alone. But many other things might have affected the amount of conformity displayed by subjects. The results might have been different if the size of the majority had been different, if the perceptual task had been easier or harder, if the majority had not been completely unanimous; one can think of many variables that might have affected the results of the experiment. Should Asch have included these variables in his experiment? How many different kinds of situations should an experimenter study in an experiment? Should the same people be exposed to all the different situations in which the experimenter is interested, or should each subject be involved in only one of the experimental situations? Often a situation has many different elements. How can the researcher arrange an experiment to rule out the possibility that some extraneous element of the situation is responsible for the results? Given that only a limited number of subjects are available, how can the experimenter get the greatest amount of valid information about the experimental question? These and other questions have to do with the form of a research question—the underlying *design* of an experiment—and they are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

Asch chose a true experimental design to answer his question about the effects of peer pressure on conformity. Not all researchers, however, limit their designs to experiments. Sometimes the nature of the research question or practical demands of real-world settings preclude the use of experiments, and researchers settle instead for alternative methods. What are some of these alternative methods of research? What situations dictate their use? What limitations are inherent in their use? How might these limitations be partially overcome? In Chapter 5, we shall take a brief detour from our focus on the controlled experiment and introduce the advantages and disadvantages of various nonexperimental methods of research in social psychology.

Assuming that an experiment is the method of choice for a researcher, how does he or she create or choose a setting for the experiment? How does the experimenter create a realistic situation in the laboratory in which to embed the treatments and measures? How does the experimenter describe the experiment to the subjects when they walk in the door? When is it necessary to have an elaborate scenario, and when will a simpler, more straightforward situation do just as well? Are there some questions better answered outside the laboratory? Should experimenters choose to conduct an experiment in the field, what real-world situations constitute an appropriate setting? What problems and concerns are unique to choosing a setting for a field experiment, and about the way they are solved? Questions about creating or choosing settings, and about the stagecraft involved in some social psychological experiments, are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

Asch chose to create a setting in the laboratory and used a group of peers who unanimously disagreed with the subject. Why did he choose this method? When a social psychologist wants to study the effect of a complicated social variable such as aggression or group pressure or authority, how is this variable created in the laboratory or the field? How can the experimenter be sure that the situation has an impact on the subject? In Chapter 7 we describe the techniques that social psychologists use to translate conceptual variables into systematically varied stimulus events.

After the subject has been exposed to the events created in the experiment, the experimenter wants to know how these events have affected the subject. How does the experimenter find out? What is measured? Should the experimenter ask the subjects, or simply observe the way they behave? If the experimenter chooses the latter technique, what exactly should be observed and recorded? How can the experimenter tell if what is being measured is what was intended? In Chapter 8 we examine the advantages and disadvantages of various kinds of measures used to study social behavior, some of the problems involved in measuring complex responses, and the questions that the social psychologist considers when choosing a measure.

Subjects in social psychological experiments are usually people, and they respond to the experimental situation with the same motivations and concerns that influence people's behavior outside the laboratory. Subjects—like most of us—want to look competent and attractive; they may want to impress the experimenter; they may want to win the experimenter's goodwill by doing what they believe is expected of them. How does the experimenter know whether the subjects are responding to the experimental situation, are just doing what they believe the experimenter expects them to do, or are simply trying to look good? How did Asch know whether his subjects were conforming to social pressure from their peers—as he intended—or to subtle social pressure from the experimenter himself, which he did not intend? How can the experimenter prevent various sources of bias? In some respects, subjects in experiments do not behave like people outside the experimental situation. Subjects in experiments are willing to do all sorts of things that they rarely do in other contexts.

How can we be sure that the subjects' behavior resembles what they would do in an analogous situation outside the experiment? How do we know that they are not doing what we ask them to do simply because they *are* in an experiment? Questions about the subjects' motivations, the experimenter's biases, and the situation's demand characteristics are examined in Chapter 9.

What happens when the experiment is over? The experimenter wants to know how subjects feel, what they thought of their experience, whether they interpreted the situation as the experimenter intended, and why they responded as they did. The subjects, however, will want to know what the experiment was all about, and how well they did. If deception of any kind has been employed in the experiment, subjects may find themselves embarrassed at having been "duped" or may even feel angry at having been "lied to" when the experimenter reveals the particulars of the deception and reasons for it. The subjects may also need some reassurance if the experimental situation was difficult, confusing, painful, or embarrassing. At the end of the experiment, the experimenter and subjects have a talk. Ideally, all the questions on both sides are answered, and the subjects leave feeling that the experience was valuable and rewarding and that they have made a real contribution to the research enterprise. In Chapter 10 we discuss this delicate and important conversation between subject and experimenter and present some ideas that may help to ensure that it accomplishes all its goals.

An experimenter's professional responsibilities do not end upon successful completion of an experiment. As a scientist, the experimenter wants to share her or his newfound knowledge with peers, for that is how social psychology—like other sciences—advances. Professional journals are the primary vehicles by which the results and implications of experiments are communicated. So, once the subjects have left the experimental setting enlightened, and once the data have been analyzed, it is the task of the experimenter to write up a report of the experiment. Typically, before the report appears in a social psychological journal, it is reviewed by experts in the field and, if necessary, revised by the experimenter before it is published. In psychology, there is a standard format experimenters use to communicate their findings. What form does the report take? How is it organized? What is included, and what is omitted? Is one particular style of writing preferable to another? Who is the intended audience? In Chapter 11 we will share our recommendations—and those of other researchers in social psychology—for writing an accurate, thorough, and engaging report once an experiment has been completed.